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Abstract
In this paper, I examine the effects of implementing tighter Intellectual Property Rights in
a model of International Trade. In my model, firms in different countries have the choice of
committing their resources to introducing new products (product innovation) or to imitating
and improving upon current products (process innovation). I analyze the impact of stronger
patents on innovation decisions, overall welfare and the distribution of welfare among countries.
I show that, depending on parameter values, firms in developed countries (North) may altogether
specialize in product innovation or may attain incomplete specialization in the sense that some
innovate and some imitate. Welfare analysis will depend on the degree of specialization. In the
case of incomplete specialization, tighter IPRs increase the incentives for product innovation
in the North but, at the same time, increase the imitation done in the South. This finding is
contrary to the conventional argument that states the reverse for imitation rates. In the case
of complete specialization, stronger patents do not affect the rate of product innovation but
reduce the rate of imitation, and welfare is nonmonotonic in IPRs. Finally, I examine the case
of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and predict that stronger patents will increase the FDI while
lowering the wages worldwide.
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1 Introduction
Over the last thirty years, there is an obvious trend towards the implementation of stronger
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) worldwide. This trend started in developed world, especially
in the USA after the establishment of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. After the collapse
of the Communist Block and increasing integration of developing nations into the world economy,
the USA and other developed countries have been continuously pressuring other nations to follow
their lead in implementing stronger IPRs. Not only has the definition of what is patentable has
broadened1, but countries have started to harmonize with each other with regards an ever growing
catalogue of products that are subject to patents2.
Stronger IPRs have been one of the main topics of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations
under the World Trade Organization (WTO). As a result of these negotiations, agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) have been signed by the members
of the WTO. TRIPs set minimum standards for protection of intellectual property and provides
harmonization of policies between countries. Most importantly it requires National Treatment,
treatment of foreign and national applicants equally as defined by the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property. Finally, thanks to the The Patent Cooperation Treaty, inventors
can seek for worldwide protection since 1970s.
The main motivation behind all this policy push by developed market economies has been
helping the innovators to appropriate the fruits of their labor. The idea is simple: patents create
incentives for innovators at the expense of welfare costs arising from the monopolies they create.
So when one compares static costs of a monopoly created by patents against dynamic benefits of
more innovation you usually come up with an inverse U shaped welfare curve as a function of some
measure for patent strength (Nordhaus, 1969). Recently there has been a surge in literature that
questions this framework and has produced different results with regards to finding optimal patent
1The most obvious example being software
2Many countries did not grant patents for pharmaceuticals until 30 years ago(Qian, 2007)
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policy. The first problem arises from the way innovation is defined. Innovation is always thought
as the act of coming up with a completely new product. But a huge portion of R&D efforts is
done in order to enhance current products, by making them cheaper, or adding new features to
them. This is called the case of sequential innovation. In this regard, stronger patents may create
roadblocks for future enhancement of current products. Scholars investigated the issue of compen-
sation for the original innovator (Scotchmer, 1996), but problem evolved into questions of how not
to prevent following innovations through wrong and excessive patent rights (Bessen and Maskin,
2009) . Stronger IPRs provides more protection and incentives for the first innovator but impairs
the efforts of those who follow3(Scotchmer, 1996; Bessen and Maskin, 2009).
Another issue facing the analysis of IPRs is the increasing relevance of international trade
and how it alters the welfare analysis conducted for a closed economy. On the one hand trade
spreads the benefits of innovations across countries while making it harder for local innovators to
appropriate the benefits. This encourages innovating countries to argue for stronger patents in
other countries. On the other hand, there is always an incentive to impose weaker protection for
foreign innovations as profits from patent granted monopolies go abroad and consumer surplus
that arises from weaker protection stay within the country. This may create incentives towards
implementation of weaker IPRs compared to optimum when countries act independently. This is
the main argument behind harmonization of IPRs throughout the world. But the optimality of
harmonization has been questioned as well and critics usually underscore that harmonization brings
too much protection compared to the optimum (Grossman and Lai, 2004; Scotchmer, 2004).
This paper analyzes the effects of the implementation of stronger IPRs in context of the two
issues just discussed. Innovation is the decision of allocation of resources for reaching different
kind of ends: it may be about releasing a new product to markets, or it may be about enhancing
current products, making them cheaper and capturing product lines (this is referred as imitation
3In their book The Case Against Intellectual Property, Boldrin and Levine (2008) advocate the complete removal
of IPRs. They discuss the case of the steam engine and how patents actually hindered its further development and
highlight the costs to the society. On the other hand Selgin and Turner (2006) provides a rebuttal for Boldrin and
Levine.
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in the literature). Same resources can be used for both “innovation” or “imitation”. Countries
have different comparative advantages with regards to different kinds of innovations. Even though
many developing market economies are putting resources into Research and Development, they
are seen as failures in terms of creation of innovative economies. What is happening in fact is
that these economies are not failing but specializing in certain types of R&D, defined as “Process
innovations”. These are the follow up innovations to original product innovations. A Ricardian
type of specialization in the world economy in types of the R&D economies conduct arises thanks to
International Trade. Currently, many developing nations are creating and organizing supply chains
which do not exist in the developed world and those nations are conducting research towards
incremental innovations (Breznitz and Murphree, 2011). OECD reports points to this fact as “too
much Development and too little Research” in case of China (OECD, 2008: 69).
In this paper I use the product cycle framework developed by Vernon (1966); Krugman (1979);
Grossman and Helpman (1991b). My paper is similar to Helpman (1993)’s. But I divert from this
framework by not just assuming the emergence of specialization patterns but also explaining how
they emerge. For this purpose I use the framework provided by Saint-Paul (2002). This framework
is rich in analyzing how resources for innovation are allocated between different kinds of research
in different countries with different characteristics. In my paper innovation and imitation are not
separate and one dimensional activities for firms. Firms decide on the kind of research they want
to conduct, they are not bound to make only one type of research depending on their location. As
a result, different patterns or degrees of specialization between countries arise. Welfare effects of
stronger patent protection will be different in a world where there is a complete specialization of
innovation and imitation between countries and in a world where there is incomplete specialization.
In this sense I show that welfare analyses done in product cycle models are usually incomplete.
In sections two and three, I introduce the model and explain the possible equilibria and special-
ization patterns emerging in the world economy. I show that countries with different capacities for
novel-product innovations cannot do both kinds of innovations at the same time. One country will
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always completely specialize. The existence of trade exacerbates the differences between countries
in terms of R&D they may conduct otherwise.
In section four, I introduce patent reforms to model. I show that depending on the kind of
equilibrium an economy is in, patent reforms may have unintended results. Reforms implementing
stronger IPRs usually slow down the follow-up innovator. They make it harder for the follow-
up innovator to conduct research and invent around existing patents and reduce the amount of
imitation in the world economy. But in our case, it may actually have an opposite effect depending
on if the developed market economy has incomplete specialization. In the case of incomplete
specialization, patents will induce firms in developed countries to put more resources into novel-
product research. More importantly, this will allow firms in developing market economies to imitate
more easily as they will have less competition in imitation and they will have more products to
improve upon. Moreover patents will push countries towards more specialization. I show that
increased IPRs in such a case can hurt welfare in developing countries depending on parameters
chosen, but this is possible only if they hurt developed countries first. These results are contrary
to standard argument that states stronger patents will decrease imitation in developing countries,
will more likely to benefit developed market economies at the expense of developing countries.
In case of complete specialization in R&D between countries (the case usually analyzed in the
product cycle literature), stronger patents may not have any impact on the rate of novel-good
innovation at all, yet they will alter the welfare distribution. Unlike the previous case, here I
show that tighter IPRs don’t increase the innovation, but will decrease the imitation. For a range
of parameter values I show that tighter IPRs increase welfare in developed countries, but reduce
overall welfare by reducing the welfare in the developing market economies. Policy implications
contrast sharply between complete and incomplete specialization cases.
Then I discuss the difficulties that a developing market economy faces in promoting Product
innovation through subsidies.
Finally the last part of the paper introduces Foreign Direct investment by multinational firms
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and allows us to see how multinational firms react to different IPRs regimes and how they change
their investment decisions accordingly.
2 Model
I consider a world economy with two freely trading countries and a continuum of industries
indexed by j ∈ [0, Nt], Nt being the number (measure) of variety of goods available at each instant
of time t. The model is based on Saint-Paul (2002) model. Each good is provided by one company
who act as monopoly and each firm is only providing one good.
There are two types of innovation activity; “Product Innovation” and “Process Innovation”.
Former is the action of introducing a novel product that was not being produced before and latter
consists of making the production of a novel product more efficient. Two countries are differentiated
by their capacity in terms of their product innovation; “North” being more capable of introducing
novel products, i.e. their product innovation rate per researcher is higher than “South”.
2.1 Households
Households worldwide share an identical preferences for differentiated products. Their welfare
equals the discounted flow of instantaneous utility u(t):
U =
∞∫
0
e−ρt lnu(t) dt (1)
The static utility function takes the classic Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) form:
u(t) =
(∫ Nt
0
c(j, t)αdj
)1/α
, 0 < α < 1 (2)
In (2) c(j, t) denotes amount of differentiated product j that household consumes. Nt represents
the number (measure) of varieties available on the market at time t.
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The representative household maximizes (1) subject to the following budget constraint:
∞∫
0
e−R(t)X(t) dt ≤
∞∫
0
e−R(t)Y (t) dt+A(0) (3)
where X(t) and Y (t) are the individual flow of spending and income at time t, A(0) is the
value of assets households held at time zero and R(t) =
∫ s
0 r(s) ds is the cumulative interest rate.
I assume there is free international capital flow and same interest rates prevail in both countries at
all times.
The solution to inter-temporal maximization problem gives us:
X˙(t)
X(t)
= r(t)− ρ (4)
The allocation of expenditure across products at each point in time gives us the instantaneous
demand for variety j:
c(j, t) =
p(j, t)−σ∫ Nt
0 p(i, t)
1−σdi
X(t) (5)
where p(j, t) is the price of variety j at the time t and σ = 11−α is the elasticity of substitution.
We’ll define a world price index as:
P =
Nt∫
0
p(i, t)1−σdi
and normalize it to 1 for each time period t . Household income consist of wages they earn and
profits they acquire from firms as they are the owners of the firms.
Since we have normalized the overall price level to one at all times, we obtain the indirect utility
function
lnu(t) = lnX(t)− lnP (t) = lnX(t) (6)
Instantaneous utility function is equal to spending at each period.
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2.2 Innovation and Manufacturing Technologies
Labor is the only factor of production for both manufacturing and innovation. Both North and
South have a measure of 1 labor, out of which zi are researchers and 1 − zi are manufacturing
workers. There are two types of innovation that can be undertaken by researchers; product innova-
tion which results in creation of blueprints for primary goods that did not exist before (same as in
Grossman and Helpman (1991b)) and process innovation which involves introduction of secondary
goods which are improvements upon primary goods. Secondary goods are cheaper to produce and
eventually replace primary goods in the market . From customers’ perspective there is no difference
if they consume primary or secondary goods; they receive the same utility from consumption of
same quantities.
As a result, goods have two stages in their manufacturing cycle, first they are produced as
primary goods and production of each unit of primary good requires 1 unit of labor. Later they
are exposed to further improvements in form of process innovation and I call them as secondary
goods afterwards. A unit of secondary good requires λ units of labor to be produced, where λ < 1.
Goods can be improved only once. Finally goods are going to be obsolete at a rate of δ. Both
secondary and primary goods get to be obsolete at the same rate. As a result, some primary goods
do not get to be improved upon before they become obsolete.
Let zi1 indicate number of researchers working for product innovations in country i, whereas
zi2 indicates number of workers working for process innovation. We define z1 = zN1 + zS1 as the
total number of product innovators globally, and z2 = zN2 + zS2 as the total number of process
innovators globally.
Similarly, let ni1 denote the number of primary goods being produced in country i, and ni2
indicates number of secondary goods. ni = ni1+ni2 is the number of goods produced in each country
i, and n1 = nN1+nS1 is the number of primary goods available to customers. n2 = nN2+nS2 is the
number of secondary goods. There is free trade; every type of good is being offered to customers
without any trade costs. At each point in time t, nN (t) + nS(t) = n1(t) + n2(t) = Nt.
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2.2.1 Product Innovation
One unit of researcher in country i creates γidt amount of novel goods if they work dt amount of
time. By assumption γN > γS , that does not necessarily mean that researchers in North are more
capable with coming up with new ideas. It says researchers doing product innovation in North
are able to transform the novel ideas they come up with into actual products more rapidly. This
difference between countries arises mainly due to differences in institutional arrangements. One
such difference may arise in how such innovations are financed. As we will see, product innovation
is a more risky business compared to process innovation. Lack of a capable capital market that
can utilize sources like venture capital to finance risky innovations properly can contribute to such
a gap (Orman, 2008).
In any case, the reason for gap between two countries’ primary innovation capabilities is beyond
the scope of this paper. Once a primary product is innovated, its manufacturer gains the monopoly
rights to it, and sell it until its product is replaced by a secondary innovation or becomes obsolete.
2.2.2 Process Innovation
Process innovation is described through a matching function the way it is described Saint-Paul
(2002), inspired from job matching functions from labor literature(Pissarides (2000) ). Researchers
can improve upon any good on the market regardless of the origin of the good or researcher.
In a state where there are z2 amount of process innovation researchers working on n1 number
of primary innovations, there are M number of matchings (successes), where M is found via a
matching function M :
M =M(n1, z2) =
(z2)
α (n1)
1−α
m
(7)
This function represents the congestion and decreasing returns that arise when there is increas-
ing number of secondary innovation researchers.4 This matching function is a generalized version
4In Acemoglu and Cao (2010), same idea of congestion arises and they explain it as a result of “fishing in the
same pond; replication of ideas and efforts by different researchers”.
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of innovation functions used in Grossman and Helpman (1991a) where α was taken equal to 0, or
Helpman (1993) where α was taken equal to 1. One crucial aspect of this paper will be to capture
the process of decision of allocating resources on different kinds of innovations. As a result z2
is a variable needs to be taken into account. And just like in Helpman (1993), number of novel
goods n1 is also a factor that affects rate of replacement (imitation) of primary goods that needs
to be taken into account: Matching function captures positive spillover effect of a higher n1 for
process innovation, while decreasing returns to higher numbers of process researchers, z2. A very
low number of primary goods would mean very low returns to process innovation.
Variable m captures the idea of frictions arise that process innovators face. More strongly
enforced and more broadly defined patents increases m in this model5. One interpretation for this
is that patents is making it harder for followers to imitate and come up with improvements upon
new products. It will be harder for secondary innovators to “invent around” the patented product
stronger the patents are. This is in line with the literature concerning sequential innovations. A
stronger patent makes it harder for others to follow up with improvements for the same good
(Bessen and Maskin, 2009; Hopenhayn et al., 2006). In this sense, stronger patent systems are
implemented to divert more resources to introduction of novel goods.
A researcher can create κdt number of secondary goods if they work dt amount of time. κ
is the arrival rate of secondary innovation that is endogenously determined within the system via
matching functionM . Likewise we define the rate of replacement of primary goods through process
innovation as ν. We derive the values for κ and ν as follows:
κ =
M(n1,z2)
z2
=
1
m
(
n1
z2
)1−α
ν =
M(n1,z2)
n1
=
1
m
(
n1
z2
)−α
(8)
As a result of the structure of matching function, we have a mechanic relationship between κ
5This is similar to Helpman (1993), where tighter IPRs basically increased the friction to imitation
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and ν expressed by what we will refer as matching frontier throughout paper:
(mκ)1/(1−α) = (mν)1/(−α) (9)
I assume that countries synchronize their patent system, enforce the same level of protection.
They also provide national treatment, which is a requirement of TRIPs6 agreement that was negoti-
ated during Uruguay rounds. National treatment prevents countries to discriminate against foreign
goods when it comes to intellectual property rights protection (World Intellectual Property Organization,
1968: 223-224).
Finally I assume that secondary good producers have monopoly powers as well. Secondary
good producers do not have to compete with each other as it is not profitable to spend resources
to improve the same primary good and get zero profits. I assume that λ is significantly small that
the secondary good producers are able to charge limit monopoly price and drive the primary good
producers out of the market. We can also think that secondary goods producers are also receiving
a patent, hence ensuring their monopoly rights and avoiding a Bertrand competition with primary
good producers.
2.2.3 Law of Motion for Variety of Goods
Finally let us sum the law of motions for the number of products available in the market:
∂n1
∂t
= − (δ + ν)n1 + γNzN1 + γSzS1
∂n2
∂t
= −δn2 + νn1 = −δn2 + κz2 (10)
∂N
∂t
= −δ(n1 + n2) + γNzN1 + γSzS1
Figure (1) represents flow rates for each type of good. At a steady state equilibrium number of
goods are stable, i.e. ∂n1∂t = 0,
∂n2
∂t = 0 and
∂N
∂t = 0. One thing to note here is that, at a steady
6Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
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Primary Goods Secondary Goods
γz1
n1 n2
δn1 δn2
κz2
νn1
Figure 1: Law of Motion for Goods
state equilibrium total number of goods N depends only on the number of product innovators zi1
allocated by each country i. At a steady state, N = γNzN1+γSzS1δ .
3 Market Equilibrium
We will be looking at the steady state equilibria only.
3.1 Prices and Wages
Taking into account demand function for a firm’s product that was given by (5), and the fact
that we normalized world price index to one, we get the demand equation cj = Xp
−σ
j , where X is
the total world expenditure on goods(We’ll indicate spending in North and South as XN and XS
respectively). Since firms are acting as monopolies on goods they provide, their pricing decisions
can be summarized as:
pj =


µwi if primary good
µλwi if secondary good
for i = N,S (11)
where wi is the manufacturing wage rate in country i, and µ is the monopoly mark-up over per
unit cost of goods, with µ = σ/ (σ − 1). Compensation for researchers in country i is indicated by
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fi.Then the flow of profits for manufacturer who is producing primary goods in country i is given
by:
pii1 = (µ− 1)Xw
1−σ
i µ
−σ (12)
whereas for secondary good producer it is:
pii2 = (µ− 1)X (λwi)
1−σ µ−σ (13)
3.2 Earnings and Costs of a Firm
Net present value of expected earnings V are determined by the following functions for primary
and secondary goods manufacturers:
rVi1 = pii1 − (δ + ν)Vi1
rVi2 = pii2 − (δ) Vi2
for i = N,S. From which we find that:
Vi1 =
(µ− 1)Xw1−σi µ
−σ
r + δ + ν
Vi2 =
(µ− 1)X (λwi)
1−σ µ−σ
r + δ
(14)
The cost of creating a blueprint for a primary good in country i is Fi1 =
fi
γi
, whereas cost of
replacing a primary good with a secondary good is given by Fi2 =
fi
κ .
3.3 Finding the Equilibrium
3.3.1 Closed Economy
In order to talk about an equilibrium in a world where we have trade, we first describe an
equilibrium in a closed economy. We can use the same notation but just dropping the notations
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for countries.
In a closed economy, value V of a firm has to be equal to cost of R&D of either product and
process innovations ,depending kind of good it is. As a result the conditions F1 = V1 and F2 = V2
need to be satisfied. This is a result of free entry assumption on the markets. If blueprints are too
cheap for either kind of goods (F1 < V1 or F2 < V2), demand for the researchers will go up, driving
the wages f up. Likewise cost of blueprints F can not exceed expected earnings V , some of the
prospective manufacturers will leave the market. If we define RR = V1/F1V2/F2 , then we get:
RR =
λσ−1 (r + δ) γ
κ (r + ν + δ)
(15)
The free entry assumption in a closed economy requires RR = 1. RR = 1 curve gives us values
for (ν, κ) where V1/F1V2/F2 = 1.
Using RR = 1 and matching frontier equation (9), we find the equilibrium κ and ν values in
this economy. Then using equilibrium (ν, κ) values from this economy, we can find prices, wages
and earnings(p,w, f,X) that bring this economy to equilibrium and allows us to solve for the
equilibrium allocations7. Such an equilibrium is illustrated in figure 2. In figure 2, if you pick a
pair of values (ν, κ) above RR line, then RR < 1, implying V1/F1 < V2/F2. In this case process
innovation is more profitable, and no product innovation is done. Similarly for any point below RR
curve, we have only product innovation in this economy, which contradicts with the fact that (ν, κ)
being nonzero (there has to be some process innovation going on). At equilibrium, both happen as
both will have to be equally profitable and we will be on RR curve.
3.3.2 Open Economy
In an open economy, we have a more complicated situation. There are three possible scenarios:
1. North is doing both process and product innovation, South is specialized in process innovation
7For each (ν, κ) value picked on RR = 1 we can find an equilibrium price vector (p,w, f) that ensures not only
the condition RR = 1, but also V1/F1 = V2/F2 = 1. On other points of RR, the V1/F1 = V2/F2 equilibrium will still
hold for said prices, but we will lose the last part of the equilibrium; earnings to cost ratio will not be equal to one.
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νκ
R
R
Matching
Frontier
Figure 2: Closed Economy Equilibrium
ν
κ
RN
RN
RS
RS
North-Process
South-Process
South-Process
North-Product
South-Product
North-Product
Figure 3: Innovation Regimes
2. North is specialized in product innovation, South is doing both process and product innovation
3. North is specialized in product innovation, South is specialized in process innovation
The reason for that is, RRN lies above RRS on the plane of (ν, κ). Therefore process innovation
is always relatively more profitable in South compared to North for any given values of (ν, κ).
Whenever South is doing product innovation, that necessarily implies North is also doing product
innovation. The result we get is that we won’t have a case where both countries doing both types of
innovations (or a case where South is specialized in product innovation whereas North is specialized
on process innovation). Figure 3 describes the innovation regimes for countries. Countries will be
doing both kinds of innovations when equilibrium is on their respective RR curves. And they will
do the kind of research they are assigned when equilibrium is in the indicated zones on the given
figure. But of course some of the innovation zones on that figure are not supported by any possible
equilibrium.
The equilibrium of this system lies on either RRN , RRS, or the region that lies in between.
First one correspond to scenario 1, second one correspond scenario 2, and last one correspond to
scenario 3. It can’t lie above RRN as someone has to do some product innovation or we won’t have
any goods in this economy, or below RRS since then it implies there is no secondary innovation.
This contradicts with the fact that (ν, κ) having positive values. Besides, looking at the matching
function, we see that we have the Inada Conditions being satisfied for the process innovations, i.e.
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the return for the process innovation go to infinity as the number of process innovators go to zero:
lim
z2→0
∂M(n1, z2)
∂z2
= +∞
Aside from RRN , RRS and matching frontier itself, we’ll need one more condition to locate
the equilibrium (ν, κ). We need to be more specific about possible equilibrium points in full spe-
cialization case. For this, we look at the flow rates for goods. At full specialization all southern
researchers are process innovators and all northern researchers are product innovators. From the
law of motion equation (10) and steady state condition for primary products, we get:
0 = − (δ + ν)n1 + γNz1
Then from (8), we get κz2 = νn1. Number of process innovations done by researchers are equal
to number of primary goods being replaced by secondary goods. Combining these two equations
gives us κ = νγNδ+ν
z1
z2
. Finally using the fact that at full specialization z1 = zN and z2 = zS , we have
the specialization condition:
κ =
νγN
δ + ν
zN
zS
(16)
This is a positive sloped line on (ν, κ) plane as can be seen on figure (4) as SS line. When
countries fully specialize, equilibrium (ν, κ) values have to lie on this line. Any (ν, κ) values lying
above this line indicates a situation where z1/z2 > zN/zS , which is the case that some researchers
from South is doing product innovation. Similarly any (ν, κ) values lying below this line indicates a
situation where z1/z2 < zN/zS , which is the case that some researchers from North is doing process
innovation.
Now we can define the equilibrium locus of this economy. It can be seen from figure (4). It is
the bold line segment , labeled as ”ABCD” on the graph.
The equilibrium on the world economy determined by line segment ABCD and matching fron-
tier. There are three possible scenarios depending on where matching frontier and equilibrium line
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Figure 4: Equilibrium Locus
intersect with each other. Economy may be fully specialized and be on SS curve (on CB segment
of equilibrium line). Or there are both types of innovations being conducted by South while North
is specialized on Product innovation. In this case world economy is above SS curve as indicated,
and since South will be doing both product and process innovation, both activities have to be
equally profitable in South hence economy has to be on part of RRS curve that is above SS (on
AB segment of equilibrium line). Finally there may be both types of innovations being conducted
by North while South is specialized on Process innovation. In this case world economy is below SS
curve, and since North will be doing both product and process innovation, both activities have to
be equally profitable in North hence economy has to be on part of RRN curve that is below SS
curve (on CD segment of equilibrium line).
General Equilibrium
Finally we can quickly define a steady state general equilibrium for this economy. :
For i = N,S, given the prices and wages
{
{pj}
N=n1+n2
j=0 , wi, fi
}
, total expenditures {Xi}, dis-
tribution of variety for primary and secondary goods {ni1,ni2}, distribution of researchers {zi1,zi2},
flow rates {κ, ν}; equilibrium allocation {cj}
N=n1+n2
j=0 will:
• solve the Household maximization problem:
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• maximize the producers’ profits pij ∀j,
while
• Number of goods are stationary:
γNzN1 + γSzS1 = (δ + ν)n1
κz2 = νn1 = δn2
• Cost of creating a blue print for primary and secondary products are equal to their expected
lifetime profits,
• The following equations hold for production, spending and general price level
1− zN = nN1cN1 + nN2cN2λ
1− zS = nS1cS1 + nS2cS2λ (17)
X = pN1nN1cN1 + pN2nN2cN2 + pS1nS1cS1 + pS2nS2cS2
P = 1 = p1−σN1 nN1 + p
1−σ
N2 nN2 + p
1−σ
S1 nS1 + p
1−σ
S2 nS2
where ci1 and ci2 represents the amount each primary and secondary good being produced
in country i = N,S, and pi1, pi2 are their respective prices.
Full Specialization Case
World is in a full North-Product Innovation and South-Process Innovation equilibrium depicted
in many product cycle models such as Vernon (1966),Krugman (1979) and Grossman and Helpman
(1991b). This particular equilibrium is depicted in figure (5) in our framework. In this case we
have cN2 = cS1 = zN2 = zS1 = 0.
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Figure 5: Full Specialization Equilibrium
4 Stronger Patents
Now we can look at effects of certain policy changes, especially changes in patent policy. In
this model, stricter patent policies are conducted through increasing the variable m in matching
function M . The idea is that, stronger patent policies make it harder for process innovators and
imitators to introduce secondary products to the market. It is a friction introduced in the system to
divert more resources to product innovation. It is informative to look at the case of closed economy
first to see how patent policy is conducted within this framework, results of such policies. Then we
will switch to open economy case.
4.1 Closed Economy
In a closed economy, patents always divert more resources from process to product innovation.
A stronger patent system make product innovations relatively more profitable at the expense of
making it harder for follow up innovations to capitalize on their improvements. Stronger patent
protection shifts the matching frontier left.
In the new equilibrium after the reform, number of process innovators z2 declines, and number
of product innovators z1 increases
8. Less process innovators mean a higher return per process
8To see why this is the case, suppose reverse is true. But then, unlike what happens on figure 6, return per
process innovator κ would have to decrease as a result of higher number of process innovators z2, lower number of
primary goods n1 and congestion this situation would create. For more formal proof of results I mention in this part,
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Figure 6: Patent Reform in a Closed Economy
innovator, i.e. an increase in κ, despite the existence of stronger patents. As implied by equation
(10) total variety of goods N and number of primary goods n1 always increases. The effect on n2
is ambiguous. But we can say that as long as κ is not too low, it decreases.
The effects on welfare is a little more complicated as expected. Using manufacturing constraint,
price normalization equations:
1− z = n1c1 + n2c2λ
P = 1 = p1n1 + p2n2
and inserting equilibrium prices and demand functions (equations 5 and 11) we get the equilib-
rium values for wages and total income/expenditure:
w =
(
n1 + n2λ
1−σ
) 1
σ−1
1
µ
X =
(
n1 + n2λ
1−σ
) 1
σ−1 (1− z) (18)
It can easily be seen that welfare depend on variety of goods as well as amount of consumption.
If the gains from process innovations is not big enough (ie.λ is not small enough), stronger patents
please refer to Appendix
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increase the total variety and improve welfare.
As we know now, increasing patent protection increases the rate of improvement per process
innovator (κ) while decreasing the probability of being replaced by a secondary good for primary
goods(ν). This two rates have different effects on total welfare X. Increasing κ as a result of stricter
patent laws always improves welfare, on the other hand effects of change in ν is less certain9.
Stronger patents improve welfare through ν as well as κ only when ∂X∂ν < 0. Solving the model tells
us that ∂X∂ν < 0 iff κ >
γ
(λ1−σ−1)
. Below the cut point of κ = γ
(λ1−σ−1)
, stronger patent laws’ effects
on κ and ν work against each other. But above the cut point, stronger patents always contribute
positively to welfare (see figure (7)).
In an economy with low enough product cycle rate ν or high enough κ, stronger patents lead
the economy to a higher level of welfare. It is easier to make a case for stronger patents in such an
economy.
4.2 Open Economy
In an open economy effects of a patent reform that implements stronger protection for primary
goods are more complicated. If South is specialized on process innovation completely, then North
is either doing both kinds of innovation or specialized on product innovation. Results of implemen-
tation of stronger patents to protect product innovation being done in North depend on if North
9In this economy, after all we have ∂κ
∂m
> 0 and ∂ν
∂m
< 0 as can be seen on figure 6
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is completely specialized like South.
4.2.1 Incomplete Specialization
If the economy is at equilibrium on CD part of equilibrium line on figure 4, then North is
doing both kinds of innovations. We can find how much North is allocating towards each type
of innovation in terms of (ν, κ) and other given parameters of the economy using flow equations
κz2 = νn1, n1 (δ + ν) = γz1 and z1 + z2 = zN + zS
10. The allocation of researchers determine the
number of goods being produced in both regions (nN1, nN2 and nS2).
Finding the distribution of goods between regions allows us to solve for the welfare and wage
values for countries. Modifying equation (17), we get the relevant equations to solve for X,wN and
wS :
1− zS = nS2cS2λ
1− zN = nN1cN1 + nN2cN2λ
1 = p1−σN1 nN1 + p
1−σ
N2 nN2 + p
1−σ
S2 nS2
where values for price(p) and demand for goods(c) can be expressed in terms of manufacturing
wages and total welfare through equations (5) and (11). Then we get the following system of
equations:
1− zS = nS2Xλ
1−σ (µwS)
−σ
1− zN = nN1X (µwN )
−σ + nN2Xλ
1−σ (µwN )
−σ
1 = (µwN )
1−σ nN1 + (µλwN )
1−σ nN2 + (µλwS)
1−σ nS2
10I will assume zN = zS = z for simplicity. Also in this case z1 = zN1, zS2 = zS, and zN1 + zN2 = zN . A complete
solution is provided in Appendix
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Finally solving for X,wN and wS we find the following values:
X = (1− z)
[(
nN1 + nN2λ
1−σ
)1/σ
+
(
nS2λ
1−σ
)1/σ]σ/(σ−1)
wN =
[(
nN1 + nN2λ
1−σ
)1/σ
+
(
nS2λ
1−σ
)1/σ]1/(σ−1) (
nN1 + nN2λ
1−σ
)1/σ
(19)
wS =
[(
nN1 + nN2λ
1−σ
)1/σ
+
(
nS2λ
1−σ
)1/σ]1/(σ−1) (
nS2λ
1−σ
)1/σ
Welfare and wages are monotonically increasing in number of goods being produced (nN1, nN2
and nS2). We will call
(
nN1 + nN2λ
1−σ
)1/σ
as the Northern contribution to welfare, and
(
nS2λ
1−σ
)1/σ
as the Southern contribution.
Stronger patent protection pushes North towards committing more resources on product inno-
vation and less on process innovation11. Even though stronger patents are introduced to increase
the friction for process innovators, κ -return per process innovator- increases in this economy.
This happens because there will be less competition among imitators as patents get stronger. Re-
searchers in Northern countries will flock to product innovation as they will receive more protection
and increase the number of goods to be improved upon, leaving more fish in the pond with less
fishermen for other process innovators. This can be seen from figure 4, where economy is moving
along the CD part of equilibrium as patents get stronger, ν declining while κ increasing.
We can provide following proposition on distribution of production between countries, which
will become crucial when we analyze welfare implications of stronger patents:
Proposition. nN1, nS2 and N are monotonically increasing with stronger patent protection, whereas
nN2 is monotonically decreasing. n2 is an inverse U shaped function of patent protection. It will
increase up to some level of protection, but then decline.
Since South is completely specialized on process innovation on CD part of equilibrium line,
return per process innovator in South increases as long as equilibrium does not move to the zone
where North also completely specialize. The conclusion we get in this case is that even though
11As m increases, ν declines. Effects of this change on distribution of goods and researchers is shown in Appendix.
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stronger patents are implemented in South as well as North, not only South does not start doing any
product innovation, but also number of goods being imitated per instance of time (κzS) increases
in South, as well as the number of products
(
nS2 =
κzS
δ
)
being produced in South.
Number of primary goods introduced to market per instance of time(γNzN1) increases as a
result of more product innovation being done in North, causing an increase in n1 =
γN
(δ+ν)zN1. A
higher n1 means more goods to work on for process innovators. These two effects overcome the
negative effect of increase in matching friction m. On the contrary, as zN1 increases, zN2 and nN2
monotonically declines. Total number of secondary goods (n2 = nS2 + nN2) being produced in this
economy is an inverse u shaped function of patent strength m, it increases up to some level of
protection, but then it declines.
Stronger patents increase the resources allocated on product innovation, and increase the total
number of goods available to consumers. In this specific case, from equation (10), we know that
N = γNzN1δ . As zN1 increases as a result of stronger patents, total number of variety of goods also
increases in this economy.
Proposition. nN1, nS2 and N are monotonically increasing with stronger patent protection, whereas
nN2 is monotonically decreasing. n2 is an inverse U shaped function of patent protection. It will
increase up to some level of protection, but then decline.
Looking at the welfare equations (19), we see that contributions of nN1 and nS2 to total welfare
are both positive as they increase as a result of stronger IPR protection, whereas declining nN2
has a negative contribution. A loss in total welfare is only possible if losses from a decline in nN2
overcome the gains from both nN1 and nS2. In such a scenario declining n2 not only decreases the
Northern contribution to welfare
(
nN1 + nN2λ
1−σ
)1/σ
despite increasing nN1, but also counteracts
the Southern contribution to welfare,
(
nS2λ
1−σ
)1/σ
.
Proposition. If total welfare X is declining as a result of stronger patent protection, then Northern
wages should be declining.
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This is easy to see. Total welfare declines if only summation of
(
nN1 + nN2λ
1−σ
)1/σ
and(
nS2λ
1−σ
)1/σ
declines. As nS is monotonically increasing in stronger patent protection,
(
nN1 + nN2λ
1−σ
)1/σ
should be declining in such a scenario. Finally wN should be necessarily declining, as it is the prod-
uct of two declining numbers in this case.
Proposition. If southern wages are declining with stronger patents, then Northern wages should
be declining as well.
The equations for both wN and wS have the common part
[(
nN1 + nN2λ
1−σ
)1/σ
+
(
nS2λ
1−σ
)1/σ]
.
If wS is decreasing, that common part is declining for sure since
(
nS2λ
1−σ
)1/σ
is increasing with
stronger patents. If that summation is decreasing as a result of tighter IPR, then X is also decreas-
ing. Finally from the previous proposition we know that as X declines, wN also declines.
These last two propositions tell us that in case stronger patent protection has negative welfare
effects, rather than the imitating South, North will be the first country to be negatively affected.
Even though such a scenario is possible depending on initial values chosen for the model, generally
it can be inferred that stronger patent protection improves the total welfare as the total variety of
goods N increases .
4.2.2 Specialization
Things will be a little different in a world where there is complete specialization. This is the
BC segment on equilibrium line on figure 4 and the case discussed in many product cycle models in
literature. But in this particular model, stronger patents do not push more researchers to do more
product innovation, unless it does not move the world economy to AB part of equilibrium where
South will also start doing product innovation. In this case implementation of stricter intellectual
property rights will fail to spur any new product innovation in world economy altogether. Results
would be different if North had the technology to switch some of manufacturing resources to more
R&D. But share of R&D in GDP has been a persistent number in developed countries, at least in
short to medium run (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2011: 165).
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In a world with complete specialization, z1 = zN , z2 = zS ,n1 = nN and n2 = nS. Using the
steady state flow equations n1(δ+ν) = γzN , n2δ = κzS like before, we obtain the number of variety
of goods as follows:
n1 =
γN
δ + ν
zN
n2 =
κ
δ
zS
We can eliminate κ from our equations using the specialization equation (16) (so that ν will be
the only variable that will determine final values of n1,n2,X,w and f). Then we get the following
equations:
n1 =
γN
δ + ν
zN
n2 =
νγN
δ (δ + ν)
zN (20)
In case of complete specialization, we will be on SS curve on figure 8. This time when a stronger
patent system is implemented, unlike the previous case, probability of secondary innovation per
researcher κ will also decline since all that patent reform do is to increase the friction variable m in
the matching function, without changing number of product innovators, z1 or process innovators z2
(assuming patent reform is not strong enough to push economy to the zone where South will also
start doing product innovation). Using equation (20) we get the total number of variety of goods:
N = n1 + n2 =
γN
δ
zN (21)
It is easy to see that the total number of goods do not depend on any variables that a patent
reform would affect (Namely κ and ν). In this case, a stronger patent reform will not change N , it
will only alter the distribution of goods that are produced in North and South.
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Figure 8: Stronger Patents in Open Economy
How about the welfare? In order to analyze the effects of implementation of said policies
on welfare, we need to solve the equations for wN , wS and X. Modifying the general equilibrium
equations from (17), we get:
1− zN = n1Xw
−σ
N µ
−σ
1− zS
λ
= n2Xw
−σ
S µ
−σλ−σ (22)
1 = n1w
1−σ
N µ
1−σ + n2w
1−σ
S µ
1−σλ1−σ
First two lines are manufacturing constraints for North and South. The last line comes from
P = 1. Solving for these equations we get:
X =
[
n
1/σ
1 (1− zN )
(σ−1)/σ + n
1/σ
2 (1− zS)
(σ−1)/σ λ(1−σ)/σ
]σ/(σ−1)
Finally, if we assume zN = zS = z, then we get:
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X = (1− z)
[
n
1/σ
1 + n
1/σ
2 λ
(1−σ)/σ
]σ/(σ−1)
wN = n
1/σ
1
[
n
1/σ
1 + n
1/σ
2 λ
(1−σ)/σ
]1/(σ−1) 1
µ
(23)
wS = n
1/σ
2
[
n
1/σ
1 + n
1/σ
2 λ
(1−σ)/σ
]1/(σ−1)
λ(1−σ)/σ
1
µ
Total expenditure X and wages wN and wS all depend on number of goods that countries
manufacture: nN = n1 and nS = n2. From these equations we derive the terms of trade and
relative wages:
pN
pS
=
(
n1
n2
)1/σ
λ−1/σ
wN
wS
=
(
n1
n2
)1/σ
λ(σ−1)/σ
A stronger patent system will worsen the terms of trade and relative wages for South as it will
increase n1and decrease n2 as it can be directly inferred from these equations.
How about the level of welfare and wages? In the complete specialization zone, increase inm (i.e.
stronger patents) decreases both probability of success for process innovators κ, and probability of
being replaced for primary goods by secondary goods ν.
Proposition. Patents have a positive effect on total welfare X, that is ∂X∂m > 0, iff ν > λ
−1
By solving the model we see that ∂X∂m = 0 iff ν = λ
−1. The total welfare is an inverse U
shaped function of patent protection m, and it has a maximum at ν = λ−1. A proof is provided in
Appendix. Implication of that is stronger patents improve welfare only when there is more than
certain level of replacement (or imitation) of primary goods: ν > λ−1. In such a case of “too much
imitation”, improvement in total world welfare as a result of increasing patent protection happens
because marginal contributions of gain from welfare improvements in the North is higher than the
marginal losses from the decline of welfare in the South.
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Of course we have no guarantee for ν = λ−1 taking place on the interval BC on figure 4 where
full specialization equilibrium occurs. It may lie to the right or left of BC interval depending on
initial parameters. This uncertainty will have different policy implications for world welfare.
Southern wages on the other hand will improve with stronger patents, that is ∂wS∂m > 0, if there
is even more replacement of primary goods compared to the case for X just discussed: ∂wS∂m > 0
iff ν > δ(σ − 1) + λ(σ−1)/σν1/σσ. Here we need higher values of ν compared to previous case to
justify stronger patents for South; wS is maximized at a higher value of ν compared to X.
12 .
This is a more unlikely scenario to realize compared to the stronger patents being good for X, it
will only happen when Northern market is so small that an improvement there will have a positive
contribution to southern wages wS as a result of increase in exports.
Finally stronger patents will improve northern wages, ∂wN∂m > 0 as long as replacement (imita-
tion) rate (ν) is not too low: ∂wN∂m > 0 iff λν
3/2 (σ − 1)+δνσ−λν1/σδ > 0. This is a scenario that is
more unlikely to realize compared to previous scenarios to begin with. Wages in north will improve
with less patents in the case of “too low ν” only because gains from exports to south will improve
northern wages despite the loss of manufacturing to south in case of an extremely impoverished
south.
These results are illustrated on figure 9. We have three cut points for ν, and to the right of
each cut point, indicated variable will improve as a result of stronger patents13. Between A and C,
patent reforms will improve wages in North at the expense of Southern wages. But between B and
C, welfare of world economy X will improve as South is worse-off. In this case, a compensation from
North to South might be a proper way to increase world welfare while making patents stronger.
Initial parameters are important as welfare and wage functions are non monothonic in degree
of patent protection. Here the welfare analysis has nothing to do with more product innovation,
but with distribution of it.
12Which is in fact equivalent to saying ∂wS
∂m
= 0 iff ν = δ(σ − 1) + λ(σ−1)/σν1/σσ , ws has a maximum at
ν = δ(σ − 1) + λ(σ−1)/σν1/σσ. When we compare the critical points where ∂wS
∂m
= 0 and ∂X
∂m
= 0, we find that it is
higher for wS .
13Those cut points indicate where welfare or wages maximized, e.g. X is maximized at B on figure 9
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Figure 9: Effect of Patent Reforms on Welfare
5 Subsidies
Many developing countries are trying to embrace a more innovative economy, and what they
mean by that is they would like to do more product innovation. Policy makers are trying to
implement policies that divert more resources to product innovation, even though wisdom and
success of such policies are increasingly being questioned (Breznitz and Murphree (2011)). This
model may explain the pitfalls a policy that makes product innovation a priority in a country that
specializes in process innovation may face.
Suppose that government in South decides to subsidize product innovation only. They announce
that they will pay a certain share of research and development expenditure that is made for product
innovation. We will indicate the mentioned fraction with u, where 0 ≤ u ≤ 1. Subsidies will be
funded through lump-sum taxes. As a result of such a selective subsidy, cost of producing a
blueprint for a primary product will be FS1 =
(1−u)fS
γS
, where as the cost of process innovation will
stay the same as before, FS2 =
fS
κ .
This modification of the system will alter the Free Entry Condition for South. Relative cost of
product innovation declines, therefore we need to modify our free entry condition RRS :
RRS =
λσ−1 (r + δ) γS
κ (r + ν + δ) (1− u)
This means an upward shift of RRS curve. Matching frontier will not be affected by such a
policy. Suppose that we are at an equilibrium where South is specialized on Process innovation,
whereas North does both kinds of innovation, namely we are on part AB on equilibrium line in
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Figure 10: Subsidies in an Open Economy
figure 4.
What figure 10 tells us that subsidies may not have any affect on what kind of research being
done in South, especially when North is doing both kinds of research14. It is possible that it may
push South to do both types of innovation when there is complete specialization of research, but
even then this will come at the expense of welfare loss from such subsidies 15 . As a result we can
say that not only that subsidies targeted at product innovation may not work at all, even when
they do their welfare effects will not be clear cut.
6 Foreign direct investment
It is very hard to make an analysis on international patent agreements without taking Foreign
Direct Investment into account. Many countries that are good at process innovations, innovations
that make it possible to produce goods cheaper, are also the countries that are big recipients of
foreign direct investment. One of the relevant issue here is the fact that many companies have been
designing their products in one country and producing the said product in another country. There
are many factors affecting foreign direct investment like political stability, institutions, geography,
14I assume South will not be able to subsidize to the point RRS lie above RRN
15Size of consumer expenditure in South will be XS − Taxes, which is indirect utility as indicated in (6). Higher
taxes will mean a loss of welfare.
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and there exists complicated scenarios involving creation of sophisticated supply chains requiring
subsidiaries in other countries. These are beyond the scope of this paper. But we can look at the
effects of an international patent reform on wages of workers, profits and investment decisions of
companies that operate on both national and multinational level within the given framework.
First of all, the same framework we have created so far will apply here, but we need to make
some minor modifications. We will look into a case where companies in North can innovate in
North but have the option to choose between producing in either North or South. As a result we
will split the nNi into two more categories based on where the goods are being produced, where i
indicates if good is primary or secondary. Some northern companies will be national companies,
designing and producing in North alone. They will be producing nNNi variety of goods. And some
northern companies will be multinational. They will design their products in North but will be
producing in South. They will produce nNSi variety of goods.
The process of finding the equilibrium flow rates (κ, ν) is same as before, and figure (5) still
applies . After finding the equilibrium (κ, ν), we can proceed and find the equilibrium allocation
of goods and wages.
We will look into the case where countries are completely specialized. As a result North will do
primary innovation whereas South will do process innovation. But when it comes to production,
South will be producing both types of goods whereas North will specialize on producing Primary
goods. Because of specialization we have the following conditions:
nN1 = n1 = nN = nNN1 + nNS1
nS2 = n2 = nS
We will look into the case where without Foreign Direct Investment, wages in North would be
higher. Otherwise there would be no investment in South by foreign companies. Thanks to Foreign
Direct Investment, wages in North and South will equalize, hence wN = wS = w.
Since all the primary innovation is being done in North, equation (21) for total number of goods
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will continue to hold as before, N = n1+ n2 =
γN
δ zN . Total number of goods depend only on how
many innovators are allocated to primary allocation and all the primary innovation is being done
in North in complete specialization case. Likewise the equations for n1 = nN and n2 = nS from
equation (20) applies here as well:
n1 =
γN
δ + ν
zN , n2 =
νγN
δ (δ + ν)
zN
Prices for primary goods is indicated as p1 and p2 for secondary goods. In this setting, prices
do not depend on where goods are originated from, all what matters is if they are primary or
secondary goods. As described in equation (11), we find that p1 = µw and p2 = µλw as a result of
monopolies maximizing their profits. Respective demand functions are derived as cj = Xp
−σ
j for
each good j. It is c1 = X(µw)
−σ for primary goods, and c2 = X(µλw)
−σ for secondary goods.
Finally, the solution to equilibrium in this economy will depend on following three equations:
1− zN = nNN1c1
1− zS = nNS1c1λ+ nS2c2
1 = nNN1p1 + nNS1p1 + nS2p2 (24)
First two equations are resource constraints for production in North and South. Last line is the
condition that price index is equal to one.
Using p1 = µw and p2 = µλw, we can express last line of equation (24) as:
(µw)1−σ
(
nNN1 + nNS1 + nS2λ
1−σ
)
= 1
From this equation we can derive the equation for w:
w =
(
nNN1 + nNS1 + nS2λ
1−σ
)1/(σ−1) 1
µ
(25)
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The effects of implementation of a stronger intellectual property rights scheme is easier to deduct
in case of foreign direct investment. As before, a stronger patent system will not increase the
total number of goods as this number depends on the number of innovators working for primary
innovation and number of product innovators simply equals to number of researchers in North.
But such a policy will decrease the flow rate κ for southern innovators as shown on figure 8, hence
increasing the number of primary goods while decreasing the number of secondary goods equally.
That means number of primary goods nN1 = nNN1 + nNS1 will increase but number of secondary
goods nS2 will decrease. Since λ
1−σ > 1, implication of this is a decline in worldwide wages as the
expression in right hand side of equation (25) decreases.
Next we will look into how decisions of northern companies on location of their production
facilities is affected by such a policy reform. Specifically we want to understand how nNN1 and
nNS1 are affected by stronger patent reforms.
Once more we will refer to equation (24), but first two lines. To keep things simpler, we
will assume zN = zS = z as before. Then using price equations p1 = µw and p2 = µλw and
corresponding demand functions c1 = X (µw)
−σ and c2 = X (µwλ)
−σ, we get:
1− z = X (µw)−σ nNN1
1− z = X (µw)−σ
(
nNS1 + nS2λ
1−σ
)
We can easily derive the condition:
nNN1 = nNS1 + nS2λ
1−σ
This equation tells us that everything else equal, there is a positive correlation between how
many goods being produced in North nNN1 and number of goods being produced in South, nS2.
Finally using the fact that nN = nNN1 + nNS1, we find the how the distribution for northern
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companies’ production will be across countries:
nNS1 =
nN − nS2λ
1−σ
2
nNN1 =
nN + nS2λ
1−σ
2
As indicated before, values for nN and nS2 = nS can be found from equation (20) as nN =
γN
δ+ν zN
and nS2 =
νγN
δ(δ+ν)zN .
16These two equations tell us that as number of goods being produced by
northern companies (nN ) increase and number of goods produced by southern companies (nS)
decline, northern companies will shift their production more to South (nNS1) while there will be
less and less variety of goods (nNN1) being produced in North.
A stronger patent system will exactly do that: it will increase nN while decreasing nS. The
results will be same as described above. More northern companies will shift their production to
South. This result is parallel to findings by Branstetter et al. (2006) and Bilir (2011)17. They
demonstrate that producers in USA increase their foreign direct investment as developing countries
implement stricter patent laws and they are protected more against imitation in these countries.
The mechanism for rising levels of FDI as a result of stronger patent laws is a little different
here. We get an increase in foreign direct investment by Northern producers despite the fact that
the probability of being replaced by a southern producer is not affected by where you locate the
production facilities of your goods. The reason for the rise in the level of foreign direct investment
in this model is loss of manufacturing in the South as a result of stronger patent laws. Strict IPRs
will limit the rate of imitation in the South, therefore causing a decline in the level of manufacturing
and wage level in the South. This will cause the Northern companies to move their manufacturing
operations to the South, and as a result wages in the North will also be driven down.
16Since we can not have negative number of goods being produced in one country, I will make the assumption
nN > nSλ
1−σto begin with. In complete specialization case, I will assume that there are sufficiently high number of
goods produced by northern companies relative to goods produced by southern companies.
17Bilir (2011) finds that patents matter more for products that has long product life cycles, products that become
obsolete less frequently. In our model, all goods have the same rate of being obsolete, δ.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper I show how the specialization patterns in R&D arise between countries. Previous
product cycle literature have taken the difference between countries as given, by assuming developed
countries doing the novel product innovation while developing countries just imitating them. I
first take R&D as a decision of choosing between conducting novel-product innovation or follow-
up process innovation, a decision that is available to residents of both developed and developing
nations. Then I show that different equilibria other than complete specialization of countries is
possible. Even though developed countries have comparative advantage in novel product innovation
and developing countries have comparative advantage in follow-up process innovation, there are
equilibria where countries do not specialize and conduct both types of research at the same time.
The only catch is that both developed and developing countries can not conduct both types of R&D
simultaneously. One group of countries has to specialize on what they have comparative advantage
at. The implication of this result is that, in the case of developed countries conducting both kinds
of R&D, developing countries will not be conducting any novel-product innovation since it will not
be profitable to do so.
Policy implications of existence of diverse equilibria are many. First of all, if developed nations
are conducting both product and process types of R&D, stronger IPRs will not decrease the rate
developing countries imitate. In the case world economy is completely specialized like it is in
product cycle literature, stronger IPRs may improve the world wide product innovation levels only
if they are drastic enough to push South to commit resources to product innovation; otherwise their
effects will only be distributive. Stronger IPRs in case of complete specialization will worsen the
terms of trade for developing countries, and will be more likely to hurt these countries more. In
contrast, in case of incomplete specialization, stronger IPRs will hurt developing countries only if
they hurt developed countries first. Lastly, subsidies to product innovation in developing countries
will not work in case of incomplete specialization where developed nations are conducting both
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kinds of R&D18.
Finally I show how foreign direct investment is affected by stronger IPRs policies. If developed
countries can set up production facilities in developing nations, their investment levels in foreign
countries will respond positively to stronger IPRs in case countries specialize in R&D they conduct.
Worldwide wages and welfare will be negatively affected by stronger IPRs laws.
18Assuming subsidy levels can not be high enough to provide comparative advantage in product innovation to
developing nations
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A Optimal Patents in Closed Economy
Matching frontier equation and free entry condition give us the following conditions:
(mκ)1/(1−α) =(mν)1/(−α)
1 =
λσ−1 (r + δ) γ
κ (r + ν + δ)
These two allow us to solve for (κ, ν). Then we get the following condition from flow rates (8):
κ =
νγ
δ + ν
z1
z2
(26)
Using equation (26) and z1 + z2 = z we get:
z1 =
κ(δ + ν)
κ(δ + ν) + νγ
z, z2 =
νγ
κ(δ + ν) + νγ
z (27)
Using steady state flow equations n1(δ + ν) = γz1, n2δ = κz2 and equation (27), we obtain the
values for n1 and n2:
n1 =
κγ
κ(δ + ν) + νγ
z, n2 =
κνγ
δ (κ(δ + ν) + νγ)
z
N =
κγ (δ + ν)
δ (κ(δ + ν) + νγ)
z
Using resource constraint and price normalization we get:
1− z = n1c1 + n2c2λ
P = 1 = p1n1 + p2n2
Solving for this equations and inserting appropriate price and demand functions give us the
38
solution for manufacturing wages and welfare in terms of n1 and n2:
w =
(
n1 + n2λ
1−σ
) 1
σ−1
1
µ
X =
(
n1 + n2λ
1−σ
) 1
σ−1 (1− z)
Substituting for n1 and n2 we can find the complete closed solution for X as follows:
X = (1− z)µ
[ (
δ + νλ1−σ
)
γκ
δ (κ (δ + ν) + νγ)
z
] 1
σ−1
We know that in a closed economy, implementation of stronger patents (an increase in m in
matching equation (7)) result in a decline in ν and increase in κ. This can be seen from figure 6.
Hence we can say
∂ν
∂m
< 0 and
∂κ
∂m
> 0
Then taking the derivative of X wrt m:
∂X
∂m
=
∂X
∂ν
∂ν
∂m
+
∂X
∂κ
∂κ
∂m
Taking these derivatives, we get ∂X∂κ > 0 ∀ (ν, κ) > 0. Then when
∂X
∂ν < 0, we know for sure
∂X
∂m > 0. We get the following condition when we take the derivative:
∂X
∂v
> 0 iff κ >
γ
(λ1−σ − 1)
If this condition holds, we know for sure patents will positively affect welfare. Otherwise effects
of a patent policy will be ambiguous.
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B Optimal Patents in Open Economy
B.1 Incomplete Specialization
We are looking at the case where North is conducting both kinds of research. Matching frontier
equation and free entry condition for North give us the following conditions:
(mκ)1/(1−α) =(mν)1/(−α)
1 =
λσ−1 (r + δ) γN
κ (r + ν + δ)
Using flow equations κz2 = νn1, n1 (δ + ν) = γz1 and z1 + z2 = zN + zS we find:
z1 = zN1 =
κ(δ + ν) (zN + zS)
κ(δ + ν) + νγN
, z2 =
νγN (zN + zS)
κ(δ + ν) + νγN
To simplify things, we will assume zN = zS = z. We can find the allocation of secondary
researchers between South and North as follows:
zN2 = z − zN1 =
z (νγN − κ (δ + ν))
κ(δ + ν) + νγN
, zS2 = z
Finally we can derive the values for nN1,nN2, nS2 and N(total number of goods) using distri-
bution of researchers and flow equations:
n1 = nN1 =
γNz1
δ + ν
=
κγN2z
κ(δ + ν) + νγN
, n2 =
κz2
δ
=
κνγN2z
δ (κ(δ + ν) + νγN )
nS2 =
κzS2
δ
, nN2 = nS2 =
κzN2
δ
=
κz (νγN − κ (δ + ν))
δ (κ(δ + ν) + νγN )
Using resource constraints for both North and South manufacturing and price normalization
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equation we get the following equations for manufacturing wages w and welfare X:
1− zS = nS2Xλ
1−σ (µwS)
−σ
1− zN = nN1X (µwN )
−σ + nN2Xλ
1−σ (µwN )
−σ
1 = (µwN )
1−σ nN1 + (µλwN )
1−σ nN2 + (µλwS)
1−σ nS2
Solving for wages and welfare we find:
X = (1− z)
[(
nN1 + nN2λ
1−σ
)1/σ
+
(
nS2λ
1−σ
)1/σ]σ/(σ−1)
wN =
[(
nN1 + nN2λ
1−σ
)1/σ
+
(
nS2λ
1−σ
)1/σ]1/(σ−1) (
nN1 + nN2λ
1−σ
)1/σ
wS =
[(
nN1 + nN2λ
1−σ
)1/σ
+
(
nS2λ
1−σ
)1/σ]1/(σ−1) (
nS2λ
1−σ
)1/σ
Implementation of a stronger patent reform (increasing m) will result in a decline in ν but an
increase in κ. Therefore we have a similar case as we had for Closed Economy:
∂ν
∂m
< 0 and
∂κ
∂m
> 0
As a result of stricter IPRs, we will have North committing more resources on primary innova-
tion. South will continue on committing all of its resources on process innovation. As a result we
have:
∂nN1
∂m
=
∂nN1
∂ν
∂ν
∂m
+
∂nN1
∂κ
∂κ
∂m
> 0
∂nN2
∂m
=
∂nN2
∂ν
∂ν
∂m
+
∂nN2
∂κ
∂κ
∂m
< 0
∂nS2
∂m
=
∂nS2
∂ν
∂ν
∂m
+
∂nS2
∂κ
∂κ
∂m
> 0
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Finally going the same route we find that N is an increasing with stronger patents. n2 = nN2+
nS2 is a inverse u shaped function of patent protection. n2 is maximized when ν
2 = δλ1−σ (1 + δ).
B.2 Complete Specialization
We get the equilibrium values for (ν, κ) from matching function and Specialization curves:
(mκ)1/(1−α) =(mν)1/(−α)
κ =
νγN
δ + ν
zN
zS
We know that z1 = zN and z2 = zS . From equation (20) we get the values for n1 and n2:
n1 =
γN
δ + ν
zN
n2 =
νγN
δ (δ + ν)
zN
Inserting those values into equation (23) will give us the solution this model:
X = (1− z)

(γNz)1/σ
(
δ + ν1/σλ
1−σ
σ
)
((δ + ν) δ)1/σ


σ
σ−1
µwN =
(
γNz
δ + ν
)1/σ(γNz)1/σ
(
δ + ν1/σλ
1−σ
σ
)
((δ + ν) δ)1/σ


1
σ−1
µwS =
(
νγNz
(δ + ν)δ
)1/σ(γNz)1/σ
(
δ + ν1/σλ
1−σ
σ
)
((δ + ν) δ)1/σ


1
σ−1
We know that ∂ν∂m < 0 from figure 8.
After taking the appropriate derivatives we find the following conditions:
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• ∂X∂m = 0 when ν = λ
−1, and second derivative is negative.
• ∂wS∂m = 0 when ν > δ(σ − 1) + λ
(σ−1)/σν1/σσ, and second derivative is negative
• ∂wN∂m = 0 when λν
3/2 (σ − 1) + δνσ − λν1/σδ > 0, and second derivative is negative
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